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ABSTRACT
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) in 1991
so that the United States could assist the former Soviet republics with the safe and secure
transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear weapons.  The CTR program seeks to
reduce the threat these weapons pose to the United States and to reduce the proliferation risks
from nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. Congress has authorized and
appropriated around $300-$400 million each year for CTR.  Most in Congress support the
core objectives of the CTR program, but some have questioned whether all of the proposed
and ongoing projects contribute to U.S. national security.  Some have also questioned Russia's
commitment, both political and financial to the some of the projects.  This report reviews
many of the concerns that have been raised in Congress during debates over CTR.  It also
provides a summary of the funding for different CTR projects.  It will be updated at least once
each year.
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs:
Issues for Congress
Summary
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program in 1991, authorizing the use of Defense Department funds to assist with the
safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and
other weapons in the former Soviet Union.  Initially, many supported U.S. assistance
as an emergency response to fears about a loss of control over nuclear weapons in the
disintegrating Soviet Union.  Now, many see the CTR program as a part of a more
comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort.
Congress has demonstrated continuing support for the CTR programs, providing
between $300 million and $400 million in Defense Department funds each year
between FY1992 and FY1998; and between $403 and $475 million each year between
FY 1999 and FY2002.  Congress has also increased its oversight efforts and added
numerous reporting requirements.  Many of these changes reflected congressional
concern with the slow pace of implementation during the first few years and with the
U.S. ability to account for its expenditures and progress on CTR projects.  The
Clinton Administration  resolved most of the issues raised during the first few years
of program, but the congressional debate over funding in recent years has revealed
new concerns about the focus of some projects in the CTR program.
The Clinton Administration credited the CTR program with significant
achievements in reducing threats from the former Soviet Union.  Some Members of
Congress disagree and believe that the CTR programs have diminished U.S. national
security by subsidizing the Russian defense establishment.  Others have argued that
Clinton Administration claims of success are exaggerated and that the programs have
produced more limited results.  On the other hand, some Members of Congress
believe that the program could do much more to protect the United States from
proliferation and terrorist threats.  Congress added funds to the FY1997 budget to
expand efforts to enhance the security of nuclear and other weapons materials in the
former Soviet Union.  But, in FY2000 and FY2001, it refused to authorize the use of
CTR funds for the construction of a chemical weapons dismantlement facility.
Members of Congress have also questioned the Administration’s spending
priorities for CTR programs.  Most support efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons.
However, Congress has prohibited the use of CTR funds for defense conversion
projects, environmental restoration projects, and housing for retired officers, and,
beginning in FY2000, in prohibited their use for the elimination of conventional
weapons. Some Members of Congress have also argued that U.S. assistance to Russia
should be linked to a number of areas of Russian military and foreign policy.  Others,
however, have argued that efforts to link CTR assistance to a wider range of Russian
activities would backfire, with Russia forgoing the assistance and retaining its nuclear
weapons while continuing the policies that brought U.S. objections.  These issues
were discussed at length during the House debate on FY1997 funding, but they were
not included in the final legislation. In recent years, Congress has approved almost all
of the Administration's request for CTR funding, but it continues to express concerns
about the focus of some CTR projects.
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1The amendment to the implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed Forces In Europe
(CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228) was sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar.  It established the
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.  For more information on this legislation, see
CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement:
Background and Implementation, by Theodor Galdi. p. 1-4.
2Congress also appropriated funds for several nonproliferation programs managed by the
Department of Energy.  These include the Materials Protection Control and Accounting
program and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.  Although these efforts began under
the auspices of DOD’s CTR program and seek similar objectives, they have been administered
by the Department of Energy since 1996.  This report does not provide detailed information
about these programs.  For details see Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.
Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety Security and Control Issues, CRS Issue Brief 98038.
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs: Issues for Congress
Introduction
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program in November 1991.  A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety
and security of Soviet nuclear weapons.  Congress responded by authorizing the use
of $400 million in FY1992 Department of Defense funds to assist with the safe and
secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical, and other
weapons.1  Congress appropriated an additional $300 to $400 million per year for the
CTR programs between FY1993 and FY1998.   It added $440.4 million in DOD
funds for FY1999, $475.5 million in FY2000, and $443.4 million in FY2001 and $403
million in FY2002.2  Most of these funds support projects in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus
and Kazakhstan — the four nations that had Soviet nuclear weapons on their
territories — but Congress has also authorized their use for projects and military
contacts in other former Soviet republics.
The CTR programs seek to reduce the threat to the United States from nuclear
and other weapons in the former Soviet Union.  Towards this end, the programs focus
on four key objectives:
! Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
! Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection with their
destruction;
! Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these weapons, their
components, and weapons-usable materials; and
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3U.S. Department of Defense.  Cooperative Threat Reduction.  April 1995.  Washington, D.C.
p. 4.
4Senator Lugar added “there is a danger of seizure, theft, sale, or use of nuclear weapons or
components during the period of transition, particularly if a widespread disintegration of the
custodial system should occur.” Congressional Record, v. 142, November 25, 1991.  p.
18004-18005.
5Congressional Record, v. 142, November 25, 1991.  p. 18004.
! Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to weapons
programs in other nations.3  
While most Members of Congress support the central objectives of the Nunn-
Lugar effort, some Members have questioned whether CTR programs truly enhance
U.S. security.  Some have objected to specific projects while others have generally
challenged the notion that the programs reduce the threat to the United States.  Many
who hold this view believe that U.S. defense dollars could be better spent on U.S.
defense programs. Others, however, believe that CTR programs can do more to stem
proliferation and enhance U.S. security.  Those who hold this view have supported
adding funds to the budget requests for CTR.
These concerns are discussed in detail in the second half of this report.  The
report first offers an overview of the evolving rationale for the CTR programs and a
brief description of processes used to implement the programs, the types of projects
supported by CTR funds, and congressional action on these programs in past years.
Overview of the CTR Program
Evolving Rationale
Emergency Response to Potential Chaos.  Initially, many in Congress
saw U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar amendment as an emergency response to
risks that could arise when the Soviet Union dissolved into its constituent republics.
Some feared that the command and control structure for Soviet nuclear weapons
would collapse, allowing leaders in the various republics, or even rogue commanders
in the field, to take control of these weapons.  Many were also concerned about the
possibilities that, in an environment of political and economic chaos, nuclear weapons
or materials might be lost, stolen, or sold on the black market and that nuclear
scientists and technicians might be tempted to sell their knowledge to nations seeking
to develop these weapons.  Senator Nunn noted that “...the former Soviet Union, still
a nuclear superpower, is coming apart at the seams.  The danger of proliferation of
existing weapons, weapons materials, and weapons know-how is growing as both the
Soviet economy and traditional Soviet control mechanisms lose effectiveness.”4  Most
acknowledged that the United States would not be able to ensure complete control
of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials in the former Soviet
Union, but many hoped that U.S. interest and assistance might “provide focus and
priority to the destruction of a large part of these weapons.”5
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6See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense.  Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995.
Washington, D.C., p. 1.
7According to DOD, the United States spends approximately $8 billion per year to maintain
and operate its strategic offensive forces.  See U.S. Department of Defense.  Annual Report
to the President And Congress.  William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, March 1996.
Washington, D.C.  p. 216.
8After a November 1998 visit to Russia to view projects funded by the CTR program, Senator
Levin stated that "we will take back what we've learned ... to Congress in order to make sure
that the anti-proliferation, anti-terrorist programs which we have put in place continue..."  See
Senators urge U.S. Cash for Russian Disarmament," Reuters, November 19, 1998.
9These problems are described in detail in Allison, Graham T., Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard
A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller.  Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of
Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Materials. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996.  p. 20-
48.
Threat Reduction, Nonproliferation, and Cooperation.  Even after the
sense of impending chaos in the former Soviet Union passed in 1992 and 1993, many
U.S. analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for
diversion or a loss of control of nuclear and other weapons.  Many began to view
CTR programs as part of a long-term threat reduction and nonproliferation effort.  In
this vein, former Secretary of Defense William Perry frequently referred to CTR as
“defense by other means.”6  He and other Clinton Administration officials argued that
CTR programs have reduced the threat to the United States — by assisting with
deactivation of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan — for far less money than the United States has spent to maintain and
operate nuclear forces to deter that threat.7  And, by helping safeguard nuclear
warheads, materials and components, the programs have reduced the risk that these
materials would “leak out” of former Soviet republics.  In addition, because projects
funded by the CTR program require extensive cooperation and because they touch on
closely held secrets of the Cold War era — nuclear weapons information — many
CTR supporters believe these efforts can also foster cooperation and build
understanding between the United States and the recipient nations.
Nonproliferation and Anti-terrorism.  By the latter half of the 1990s,
Members of Congress and analysts outside government began to show increasing
concerns about proliferation risks posed by nuclear materials in the former Soviet
Union.8  Experts noted that the Soviet Union never instituted a comprehensive control
and accounting system for these materials, relying instead on physical security and
isolated facilities to protect against attacks from the outside and the control of the
Communist regime to protect against subversion or theft from the inside.  But they
argued that these controls may no longer be sufficient to protect against theft or
diversion.9  Experts point to the frequent reports of smugglers carrying nuclear
materials (although most have not been weapons-grade materials) into Europe for
possible sale.  These reports have not identified specific nations who were seeking the
materials, but experts fear they could end up in places such as Libya or Iran, or that
they could be sold to representatives from terrorist organizations.  Although these
groups may lack the know-how to manufacture nuclear explosive devices, some have
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10The March 1995 nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinryo cult
raised the profile of this type of threat.
11 See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.  The Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative for the Former Soviet Union: Administration Proposals for FY2000. CRS
Report RS20203, by Amy F. Woolf and Curt Tarnoff..  May 20, 1999.
12 In February 1999, the General Accounting Office issued a report that reviewed and
criticized DOE’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program, which sought to
provide alternative employment for Russian nuclear scientists.  The report noted that Russian
institutes had received only  around one-third of the funds allocated to IPP projects and that
taxes, fees, and other charges had further reduced the amount of money available to Russian
scientists.  The report also questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program
officials do not always know how many scientists are receiving funds through the IPP
program.  See U.S. General Accounting Office.  Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with
DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists.
GAO/RCED-99-54, February 1999.  Washington, D.C.
postulated that they could combine radioactive materials with conventional explosives
in a “radiological” weapon that would spread poisonous radiation over a wide area.
  After experts testified that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their
crumbling security and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for
terrorists seeking nuclear or chemical materials, Congress, in the FY1997 Defense
Authorization Act, expanded the CTR programs that focus on this threat.10  Congress
not only added funds for security at facilities with nuclear materials, it also indicated
that more attention should be paid to security at facilities with materials that could be
used in chemical or biological weapons. 
Concerns about proliferation from Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons facilities intensified in the wake of the financial crisis that began in Russia in
August1998.  Congress addressed some these concerns in the FY1999 Defense
Authorization Act, when it mandated that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress
with a report on the number of individuals in the former Soviet Union with expertise
in weapons of mass destruction and the risks that might exist if these individuals sold
their knowledge to other nations. The Clinton Administration also responded in its
FY2000 and FY2001 budgets, by requesting funds to expand several DOE and State
Department programs that sought to assist Russia in safeguarding weapons materials
and finding alternative employment for weapons scientists.11  Some in Congress,
however, questioned whether these programs would be effective in stemming
proliferation, and it reduced funding for many of them.12
In January 2001, a task force sponsored by the Department of Energy called for
increased funding for programs that sought to stem proliferation from Russia’s
nuclear facilities.  This task force stated that “the most urgent unmet national security
threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or
weapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile
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Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia.  The Secretary of Energy
Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy.  January 10, 2001.  P. 1.
14Beginning in FY1996, funding for some projects that began under CTR auspices moved to
the State Department and the Department of Energy.
nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”13
Although it focused only on those programs funded through the Department of
Energy, and not those funded by DOD through the CTR program, the task force
concluded that the United States should expand its nonproliferation efforts in this area
with a comprehensive strategic plan and $30 billion in funding over the next 10 years.
Program Implementation
When Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in 1991, many Members and
experts outside government expected a relatively simple program.  They seemed to
envision an effort where, using funds from the DOD budget, officials from the United
States would travel to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to quickly safeguard
and help dismantle nuclear, chemical, and other weapons left vulnerable by the demise
of the Soviet Union.  But the process of program implementation, both within the
U.S. government and between the United States and the newly independent states of
the former Soviet Union, was far slower and more complex than many expected.
The U.S. Interagency Process.  Within the U.S. government, the CTR
program is an interagency effort.  Initially, most of the funds for CTR projects came
from the DOD budget,14 but experts with the knowledge and skills needed to
implement these projects resided in several different agencies.  For example, the
Department of Defense has provided most of the general policy direction, which
essentially determined the types of projects funded by the CTR program, and much
of the expertise needed to implement programs focused on weapons security and
dismantlement.  The State Department took the lead in negotiating the broad
agreements needed before recipient nations could receive U.S. assistance under the
CTR programs and in providing for broad policy coordination among the U.S.
agencies and between the United States and recipient nations.  It also manages funds
for the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev.  The
Department of Energy plays a major role with its Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting program which seeks to improve security and controls at facilities with
nuclear materials, its Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program (IPP), which
seeks to fund commercial employment opportunities for weapons scientists, and its
Nuclear Cities Initiative, which is designed to assist Russia with the downsizing of its
nuclear weapons complex and to promote alternative, commercial enterprises in
Russia’s nuclear cities.  The Department of Commerce has also participated in
projects that focus on establishing effective export controls in the recipient nations.
Within the Department of Defense, several organizations have responsibility for
different aspects of the CTR program.  For example, the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Office, under the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, takes the lead in
developing broad U.S. policy objectives for the CTR program and for identifying
CRS-6
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Perry, Secretary of Defense, March 1996.  Washington, D.C., 1996.  p. 64.
16U.S. Department of Defense.  Defense Reform Initiative Report.  William Cohen, Secretary
of Defense, November 1997.  Washington, D.C. 1997.  p. 19-20.
specific projects that will help achieve these objectives; this office also participates in
negotiations with recipient nations.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Military Services
also offer advice on the goals and direction of the CTR program.  Until the end of
September 1998, the CTR Program Office under the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology had also helped plan future CTR programs, and, through
the Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency), took
the lead in contracting with U.S. firms that would provide technology and assistance
to the former Soviet republics.  This office also managed day-to-day interaction with
representatives in recipient nations to make sure that U.S. assistance met their specific
needs.15  
In November 1997, Secretary of Defense Cohen announced that the CTR
Program office, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and a small program
management staff  from the Office of the Special Coordinator for Cooperative Threat
Reduction would join with the On-Site Inspection Agency in a new Defense Threat
Reduction Agency.  This new entity, which began operations on October 1, 1998, is
now responsible for managing the CTR program and implementing CTR projects.16
International Negotiations.  The United States has negotiated “umbrella
agreements” with each recipient nation that set out the privileges and immunities of
U.S. personnel who work on CTR projects and establish the legal and customs
framework for the provision of aid.  The United States and recipient nations then
negotiate agreements that identify specific projects, outline the amount of money that
the United States would commit to the particular project and identify each party’s
rights and responsibilities when implementing the projects.
Project Implementation.  According to the legislation establishing the CTR
programs, Administration officials must notify Congress at least 15 days in advance
of its intent to obligate funds for a specific project; this generally occurs before the
United States and recipient nation have completed an agreement outlining the specific
details of a project.  After completing the agreement, the United States can begin
obligating funds for that project and expending those funds.  It sets aside the amount
of money that will be needed to pay contractor fees, equipment costs, and other U.S.
agencies (such as DOE) during the implementation of the agreed project.  DOD then
contracts with the U.S. firms who will provide the assistance.  It can take several
years for the expenditures on a project to equal the amount of money obligated for
that project because funds are dispersed as work progresses and it can take several
years for contractors to complete their work.  This complex implementation process
has contributed to some of the delays in the CTR programs, but U.S. officials have
recognized the problems and improved implementation efforts in recent years.
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fourth category, "Other," includes administrative expenses and a special project on Arctic
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Focus of the CTR Projects
The Department of Defense divides the CTR program into three distinct project
areas.17  These include destruction and dismantlement, chain of custody, and
demilitarization.  Table 1, below, displays the amount of money allocated to projects
in each of these three areas as of early January 2002.  This table divides funding into
the three categories mentioned above — the amount notified to Congress, the amount
obligated in each area, and the expenditures that have occurred to date.  The
Appendix at the end of this report provides a detailed list of the amount of money
notified, obligated, and expended on specific projects in each of these categories.
Table 1.  Allocation of Funds Among CTR Program Areas





Chain of Custody 1,080 861.5 $649.4
Demilitarization 389.5 360 345
Other 133 123.5 113.4
Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense
Destruction and dismantlement projects are designed to help with the elimination
of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles.  To date, many
of the projects in this area have helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
remove warheads, deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for the nuclear
weapons covered by the START I treaty.  The United States is also helping Russia
design a destruction facility for its chemical weapons stockpile.  As Table I indicates,
more than half of the CTR funds currently obligated and notified to Congress support
projects in this category.
Chain of custody activities include projects designed to enhance the safety,
security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials.  Some of the first
CTR projects provided Russia with bullet-proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters, and
improved rail cars to enhance the safety and security of warheads as they were
transported from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to storage and dismantlement
facilities in Russia.  The United States is also helping Russia design and construct a
storage facility that will house plutonium removed from nuclear warheads when they
are dismantled.  The CTR program is also funding several projects that are attempting
to improve the security and accounting systems at storage facilities for nuclear
weapons and materials to reduce the possibility of theft or losses at those facilities.
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19Spending authority for $329 million in unobligated funds had lapsed by the end of FY1994
and $20 million was rescinded from FY1995 funds.  After the first four years, only $1.236
billion of the $1.6 billion authorized by Congress remained available for use.
Demilitarization efforts include projects that are encouraging Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan to convert military efforts to peaceful purposes.  These
include the International Science and Technology Centers, which provide grants to
scientists and engineers who had produced nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction so that they can pursue projects with peaceful objectives.  Demilitarization
funds also support projects that seek to convert defense facilities and factories in the
former Soviet Union to peaceful purposes.  And they support military-to-military
contacts between officers in the United States and those in the former Soviet
republics.  According to the Department of Defense, these contacts allow the United
States to help train military officials in the other nations so that they can better protect
weapons, technology, and weapons expertise.18
CTR Programs in Congress
This section will briefly describe trends that have characterized the funding
history and legislative oversight of the CTR programs.  A more detailed description
of the program’s legislative history from 1991 through 1995 can be found in CRS
Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement:
Background and Implementation.
Congress has demonstrated continuing support for the CTR programs.  Although
some Members have sought to reduce or delay funding in response to concerns about
specific programs, Congress has approved most of the funds that the Executive
Branch requested for these efforts.  The Senate has generally supported higher
funding levels and a broader mandate for the CTR program than has the House, in
part because the House has historically been less supportive of foreign assistance
programs, but also because the program’s original sponsors, Senators Nunn and
Lugar, and, more recently, Senator Domenici, remained active in their support.
Funding.  When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, it
authorized the transfer of $400 million in FY1992 funds from other DOD accounts
for threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union.  Few of these funds were
spent in FY1992, so Congress extended the transfer authority for FY1992 funds and
authorized the transfer of an additional $400 million from other DOD accounts in
FY1993.  In FY1994 and FY1995, the Clinton Administration requested and
Congress approved new appropriations of $400 million annually for CTR programs.19
In FY1996, Congress approved $300 million of the $371 million in Defense
Department funds requested by the Clinton Administration.  Congress also included
$33 million in the State Department budget and $70 million in the Department of
Energy budget to continue projects that had begun in the CTR program.
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The Clinton Administration requested $327.9 million in DOD funds for the CTR
program in FY1997.  The House approved only $302.9 million in its version of the
FY1997 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 3230), but the Senate added $37 million,
for a total of $364.9 million in its version of the bill (S. 1745).  The Senate also added
$57 million to the Department of Energy request of $95 million for materials control
and accounting programs at facilities in the former Soviet Union.  The House
accepted the Senate provisions and these additions were included in the final version
of the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act. 
The Clinton Administration requested $382.2 million in DOD funds and $167
million in Department of Energy funds for FY1998.  The House approved $284.7
million in DOD funds; it rejected funding that the Administration had requested for
chemical weapons destruction, nuclear reactor core conversion, and nuclear weapons
storage security.  The House also rejected some funding for DOE programs.  The
Senate, in contrast, approved the full request of $382.2 million for DOD and $167
million for DOE.  The House accepted the Senate provisions and Congress approved
the full request in the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85).
The Clinton Administration requested $442.4 million in DOD funds and $167
million in DOE funds for FY1999.  The Senate approved $440.4 million in DOD
funds for CTR programs, but the House approved only $414.4 million.  Among other
changes, the House reduced the amount requested for chemical weapons destruction
activities by $53.4 million and added $31.4 million for strategic arms elimination
activities in Russia and Ukraine.  In its report on the Bill (H.Rept. 105-532), the
House National Security Committee noted that strategic offensive arms pose a direct
threat to U.S. security, while Russia's chemical weapons pose more of an
environmental problem than a threat to U.S. security.20  The Conference Committee
adopted the Senate's position, however, approving $440.4 million without reallocating
funds from chemical weapons destruction to strategic offensive arms destruction.
Congress also approved a total of $172 million in DOE funds, adding $5 million to
the $20 million request for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program.
The Clinton Administration requested $475.5 million in DOD funds for CTR
programs in FY2000.  The Senate approved the full request but the House approved
only $444.1 million and eliminated all funding for the construction of a chemical
weapons destruction facility.  The House Armed Services Committee again expressed
its concerns with U.S. funding for Russia’s chemical weapons destruction program,
and cited a recent GAO study to question the nonproliferation benefits of such a
facility.  It mandated, instead, that U.S. assistance seek to improve security at existing
chemical weapons storage facilities.  The Conference Committee on the FY2000
Defense Authorization Bill approved the Administration’s request for $475.5 million
for CTR programs, but it also approved House position precluding funding for the
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility.
The Clinton Administration also requested $205 million for the Department of
Energy’s programs FY2000; Congress approved the full $145 million for DOE’s
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MCP&A program.  But it reduced the requests for $30 million for the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program and an additional $30 million for the Nuclear
Cities Initiative (NCI) to $25 million for IPP and only $7.5 million for NCI.  These
reductions reflected the concerns raised in the February 1999 GAO report that
questioned DOE’s oversight and the effectiveness of the programs.21
The Clinton Administration requested $458.4 million for CTR in its FY2001
budget.  The Senate Armed Services Committee approved the full amount in its
version of the FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill.  It did, however, limit the use of
funds for the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility until the
Secretary of Defense could certify that Russia was committed to providing at least
$25 million per year to help construct and operate the facility; that Russia was
committed to destroying all its remaining nerve agent; that other nations were
committed to providing funding for the social infrastructure around this facility; and
that Russia was committed to destroying its chemical weapons production facilities.
The House, in contrast, again eliminated all funding for the chemical weapons
destruction facility and provided only $433.4 million for CTR.  The House prevailed
and the Conference Report  authorizes the appropriation of only $433.4 million for
CTR and precludes any expenditures on the construction of a chemical weapons
destruction facility in Russia.  Instead, it expresses the sense of Congress that the
international community should do more to help Russia eliminate its chemical
weapons in accordance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons convention.
The Clinton Administration also requested $174 million for the Department of
energy’s MPC&A program, $22.5 million for the IPP program, and 17.5 million for
the NCI program in FY2001.  Congress approved the requested funding, and even
added several million dollars to the IPP and NCI programs.
The Bush Administration requested $403 million for CTR funding FY2002.
Although this represented a reduction of $40 million from FY2001, the funding
request did not necessarily represent a decline in support for the CTR program.
Several projects, such as the construction of the plutonium storage facility at Mayak,
had received the full amount of funding needed in previous years.  Therefore, the
Administration did not request additional funds in FY2002.  The House and Senate
both approved the Administration’s request, including the request for $50 million for
the chemical weapons destruction in Russia.  The House did, however, continue to
express concerns about this project (these are discussed below.)  
The Bush Administration’s budget request for FY2002 sharply reduced the
planned funding for the Department of Energy’s MPC&A program.  DOE had
planned to request more than $200 million at the end of the Clinton Administration,
but the Bush Administration reduced the program to 138.8 million.  However, after
the September 11 attacks renewed concerns about the possible leakage of nuclear
materials from Russia to terrorist organizations, Congress restored the funding to the
FY2001 level of around $179 million and added an additional $120 million in the
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Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill.  The Administration, in its budget, also
reduced funding for the NCI program to only $6.6 million, and sought to eliminate the
program by consolidating it with the IPP program.  Congress did combine the two
programs into a new Russian Transition Initiative, but it increased funding from the
President’s request for a total of around $30 million to $42 million, and added $15
million more in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill.
The Bush Administration also conducted a comprehensive review of U.S.
nonproliferation programs with Russia during 2001.22  Many analysts and observers
feared that this review would produce sharp reductions in U.S. assistance to Russia.
The President had pledged his support for the programs during the campaign, but
some in his Administration had questioned whether they were an efficient use of U.S.
defense dollars and an effective way to reduce the threat to the United States.
However, after completing the review, the Administration announced that it would
increase funding and expand some of the programs in FY2003.23  Most of the
increase, however, would affect the DOE programs.  The request for the CTR
Program is likely to increase by only around 10%.
Legislative Mandate.  Between 1992 and 1995, Congress expanded the
mandate of CTR programs beyond the initial efforts to aid in the safe and secure
transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons.  For
example, in the Defense Authorization Act for FY1993 (P.L. 102-484, Sec. 1412),
Congress indicated that threat reduction programs should also seek to prevent
diversion of scientific expertise from the former Soviet Union; facilitate
demilitarization of defense industries; establish science and technology centers in
Russia and Ukraine; and expand military-to-military contacts between officers in the
United States and the former Soviet republics.  The mandate expanded further in
FY1994 when Congress indicated, in P.L. 103-160, that threat reduction funds could
also be used to assist in environmental restoration at former military sites and provide
housing for former military officers who had been demobilized as a result of the
dismantling of strategic offensive weapons.  The Clinton Administration had stated
that these types of programs were needed to help convince officials in Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus to eliminate the nuclear weapons on their territories.  In
FY1994, Congress also established the Defense Enterprise Fund to facilitate defense
conversion efforts by providing grants for joint ventures between U.S. industry and
industrial concerns in the former Soviet Union.
The 104th Congress reversed previous trends and reduced the mandate for CTR
programs.  In the FY1996 Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 104-106, Congress stated
that CTR funds could not be used for peacekeeping exercises or to provide housing
for military officers.  It also denied additional funding for the Defense Enterprise
Fund.  These restrictions expanded in FY1997 (and remained in FY1998) with added
prohibitions on the use of CTR funds for environmental restoration at former military
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sites, job retraining, and defense conversion.  In the FY2000 Defense Authorization
Bill, Congress made these prohibitions permanent.
Congress did, however, expand the mandate for threat reduction programs in
other areas in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act.  During debate over that
legislation, the Senate passed a new amendment sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar
and Domenici that added $94 million to DOD and DOE budgets to expand U.S.
efforts to contain and control nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the former
Soviet Union.  Most of these funds have been allocated to DOE programs that are
designed to enhance the  safety and security of nuclear materials in the former Soviet
Union, and therefore, are not technically a part of the CTR program.  Nevertheless,
this amendment demonstrated that Congress remained willing to extend U.S.
assistance to former Soviet republics when it believed that the effort would ease
proliferation risks and enhance U.S. security.  This pattern continued in the Defense
Authorization Act for FY1999, when Congress allocated $2 million for biological
weapons proliferation prevention activities in Russia and authorized the use of CTR
funds for emergency assistance to remove weapons of mass destruction or materials
and equipment related to these weapons from any of the former Soviet republics.24 
In the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act, Congress again limited the mandate
for the CTR program.  For example, the conference committee adopted the House
language that eliminated funding for the construction of a facility that would be used
to destroy chemical weapons.  The House had questioned funding for this facility for
several years; in FY2000, its position was bolstered by a GAO report that questioned
the cost of this facility and its contribution to U.S. nonproliferation objectives.25
Congress further limited the mandate for CTR in the FY2000 legislation when it
prohibited the use of CTR funds for the elimination of conventional weapons or
delivery vehicles intended for conventional weapons.  The conferees noted that they
believed the CTR program should remain focused on the eliminating the theat from
weapons of mass destruction.
Oversight and Reporting Requirements.  Congress has expanded its
oversight of expenditures on CTR projects over the years.  In FY1992, Congress did
not specify how the Bush Administration should spend any of the $400 million that
it had provided under the Nunn-Lugar Amendment.  By FY1995, Congress had begun
to approve or reject funding requests in each of the program areas identified in the
Administration’s budget.  Congress has also added many reporting requirements to
the legislation over the years.  For example, in FY1992, Congress indicated that the
CRS-13
26Most of these obligations and expenditures occurred during 1994.  See Lockwood, Dunbar.
Getting Down to Business.  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 51, January/February 1995.
P. 12.  See also, Fact Sheet: Preventing Nuclear Smuggling.  U.S. Congress, Arms Control
and Foreign Policy Caucus.  October 21, 1994.  p. 2.
27Wilson, Heather.  Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and Nuclear Proliferation.
The National Interest, v. 34, Winter 1993/1994.  p. 29.
28For a detailed description of the process leading up to the signing of the umbrella
(continued...)
Administration should provide at least 15 days notice prior to obligation of funds to
specific projects.  By FY1995, Congress had mandated that the Administration
provide, among other things, audit and accounting reports for U.S. assistance in the
recipient nations, reports on compliance with arms control agreements, and a report
on the multiyear plans for the CTR program.  Furthermore, during debate over the
FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate expressed concerns about Russia’s
financial commitment to the CTR programs and about other areas of Russia’s nuclear
weapons programs.  As a result, it requested that the Administration inform Congress
whenever Russia asks the United States to absorb a greater portion of the costs for
specific projects.  It also required  the Administration re-submit certifications on arms
control compliance and weapons modernization that had been required by earlier
versions of the legislation.
Issues For Congress
Program Implementation
Pace of Implementation.  The slow pace of implementation proved to be the
key concern for Congress during the first few years of CTR efforts.  The Bush
Administration spent less than $30 million during the program's first year.  After three
years, the Bush and Clinton Administrations had obligated $434 million but spent only
around ten percent of the $1.2 billion that Congress had appropriated for CTR
efforts.26  Authority to spend $329 million of the original $1.2 billion had lapsed by
the end of 1994.  
Analysts have highlighted several factors that slowed the process of obligating
funds for CTR projects during the program’s early years.  First, some have noted that
the Bush Administration did not support the program, believing it was premature and
that U.S. defense funds would be better spent on U.S. defense programs.  Although
the Bush Administration sent negotiating teams to Moscow for protracted
discussions, it did little to identify specific projects until Congress grew restless with
the inaction.27
Another source of delay was the negotiation of umbrella agreements with the
recipient nations, a process that took several years to complete.  Congress authorized
U.S. assistance in late 1991; the agreement with Russia was signed in June 1992, with
Belarus in October 1992, with Ukraine in October 1993, and with Kazakhstan in
December 1993.28  Negotiations on agreements for specific CTR projects have also
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proven to be time consuming.  The United States has had to identify responsible
officials in newly independent states where lines of authority and responsibility have
not always been clear.  In addition, the United States has had to overcome the
suspicions of many of these officials to convince them that they should accept U.S.
assistance.29  In some cases, these officials were unwilling to allow U.S. access to
sensitive nuclear facilities in Russia unless the U.S. allowed Russian officials
reciprocal access at U.S. facilities.
Even after the United States completed agreements with the recipient nations,
it was unable to accelerate the obligation and expenditure of CTR funds because most
of the funds were to be used to pay U.S. contractors who would then undertake the
projects in the recipient nations.  For several years, the Department of Defense used
its standard contracting procedures to seek proposals and award contracts for these
projects.  In early 1994, the Department of Defense established a separate CTR
program office to expedite the contracting process.
This change, along with the political commitment expressed by the Clinton
Administration and the completion of negotiations with the recipient nations, have
accelerated the CTR program.  Obligations have increased from around $100 million
in early 1994 to over $2.6 billion in January 2001.  The rate of expenditures has also
accelerated, with nearly $2 billion expended through the end of the year 2000.  Table
2 summarizes the amount of money allocated to projects in each of the recipient
nations in early January 2002.
Table 2.  Allocation of CTR Funds by Recipient Nation
(in millions)
Notified Obligated Expended
Russia 2,320 1,818 1,367
Ukraine 661.7 592 537.3
Belarus 70.0  69.4  68.7
Kazakhstan 163.5 156  147.6
Other 333.6 291 260
Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense
Accountability.  Congress has also expressed concerns about the U.S. ability
to account for funds spent on CTR projects.  Because Congress saw few results in the
early years, some worried that CTR funds were being squandered on airplane tickets
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and hotel rooms for U.S. delegations to Moscow.30  In addition, in 1994, the General
Accounting Office reported that the United States had yet to conduct any audits or
examinations to confirm that CTR funds were being used in the intended manner.31
As a result, in the FY1995 Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated that the
Secretary of Defense submit a report on U.S. efforts to ensure that assistance
provided under CTR programs “is fully accounted for and that such assistance is being
used for its intended purposes.”32
In a study published in 1995, the General Accounting Office reported that the
United States had begun to conduct audits and examinations of CTR projects in
Russia and Ukraine.33  But this same study raised new questions about the use of U.S.
assistance when it reported that some scientists who received grants from the
International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) “may also continue to be
employed by institutes engaged in weapons work.”34  GAO interpreted this finding to
mean that the centers had not succeeded in redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful
endeavors.  Other critics of the CTR program claimed that GAO’s findings indicated
that, by supporting Russian weapons scientists, U.S. funds were supporting Russian
weapons programs.
The State Department disputed both of these conclusions, noting that the grants
from the ISTC were intended to supplement, not replace the scientists income from
work in other institutes.  This was a not a defense conversion project, but a
nonproliferation program that sought to provide weapons scientists with added
income from work on peaceful projects so that they would not sell their knowledge
and skills to nations outside the former Soviet Union.  And the State Department
claimed that the United States could be sure that the scientists were not using ISTC
grants to support their work at defense-related institutes.
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Value of U.S. Assistance Under CTR
Relationship to U.S. National Security.  The Clinton Administration states
that the CTR program has helped the United States achieve “some tremendous gains
... toward ensuring our security by helping to eliminate weapons that could be aimed
at us and by helping to prevent weapons proliferation to hostile countries.”35  To
support this conclusion, the Administration cites numerous developments, including
the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan;
the accelerated reductions of strategic offensive weapons in Russia, the enhancement
of safety, security, and control of fissile material and weapons in Russia; the transfer
of 600 kilograms of enriched uranium from insecure facilities in Kazakhstan to secure
facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and the increases in transparency and
understanding afforded by the cooperation among military officials from all the
participating nations.36
Some supporters of the CTR have argued that the projects have not done as
much as they could to advance U.S. national security interests because they focused
more on security and control over nuclear weapons than on the security and control
of materials that can be used to make nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.  They
note that, in relative terms, these materials are in a far more precarious position than
nuclear weapons and that proliferation resulting from the leakage of materials out of
the Soviet Union is a far more likely threat to the United States than proliferation
from the illegal sale or transfer of warheads.  They believe that terrorist groups or
nations such as Libya and Iran might use these materials to develop their own
weapons of mass destruction.37  In response to these concerns, Senators Nunn, Lugar,
and Domenici sponsored an amendment to the FY1997 Defense Authorization Bill
that would expand funding, through both the CTR programs and Department of
Energy programs, for efforts to secure and control fissile and other materials that pose
a proliferation risk.38  And, as was noted above, a recent report by a DOE Task Force
called for a further expansion of these efforts to address “the greatest unmet national
security threat”to the United States.
On the other side of the debate, some observers, both in Congress and outside
government, have argued that the CTR programs could diminish U.S. national
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security by subsidizing the Russian defense establishment.  During the debate over
CTR funding for FY1997, Representative Solomon stated that “if we are giving them
this money, it is freeing up other money” and he added that “we are subsidizing the
Russian Government to dismantle old nuclear missiles while they are still in the
process of modernizing and building up other nuclear missiles.”  Representative
Hunter summarized this point of view when he asked, “does it make sense for us to
subsidize the Soviet Union to the tune of some $300 million?”39  Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld appeared to share these concerns during his confirmation process in January
2001 when he said that Russia should not request additional funding for weapons
dismantlement while it continued to build new weapons.
Although the debate over this issue has calmed in recent years, some Members
of Congress remain concerned.  For example, in its report on the FY1999 Defense
Authorization Act, the House National Security Committee noted that it remained
concerned about Russia's willingness to eliminate  weapons systems without U.S.
assistance, in spite of its START I Treaty obligations and in light of the fact that it
continued to spend its own resources on strategic offensive arms modernization
programs.40  In addition, Congress prohibited funding for a chemical weapons
destruction facility in the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act, in large part because
a GAO study had raised questions whether that this facility would further U.S.
nonproliferation objectives, and, therefore, enhance U.S. national security.  The GAO
study also raised questions about the plutonium storage facility at Mayak, and noted
that the United States “lacked clear assurances” from Russia that this facility would
house nuclear materials removed from weapons that had threatened the United States.
As a result, Congress conditioned U.S. funding for a second wing at this facility on
U.S.-Russian agreement on transparency measures that would provide these
assurances.
Those who support the CTR programs have argued that U.S. funds are not
supporting the Russian defense industry or other Russian military and foreign policy
activities.  They note that the United States does not provide Russia with cash that it
can divert to these efforts; it provides technology, expertise, and other in-kind
assistance for specific projects.41  These analysts also contend that, without U.S.
assistance, Russia would simply choose not to pursue the safe and secure elimination
of its older nuclear weapons while continuing to spend its own funds to modernize its
forces or pursue other military goals and foreign policy goals.42  Hence, the CTR
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program has provided Russia and the other recipient nations with an incentive to
pursue denuclearization efforts that are a high priority for the United States.
Relationship to Key Program Objectives.  Some observers dispute the
Clinton Administration’s positive assessment of the value of CTR assistance by noting
that the program has failed to result in the verified dismantlement of any nuclear
warheads.43  The Clinton Administration and other supporters of the CTR programs
have responded to this criticism by stating the “CTR program never set out to
dismantle warheads directly.”  The goal was, instead, to facilitate in the
“transportation, storage, safeguarding and destruction of nuclear and other
weapons.”44  And officials in Russia have repeatedly insisted that they have the means
to dismantle their warheads themselves and, therefore, do not need U.S. assistance
with that effort.
Even those who do not use the single measure of dismantled warheads have
questioned whether U.S. assistance has achieved the goals that the Clinton
Administration attributed to the program.  For example, the Clinton Administration
argued that CTR assistance has resulted in the complete denuclearization of Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus.  But others point out that most CTR projects were in their
early stages when these nations gave up the nuclear weapons on their territories, so
the amount of CTR money actually expended (as opposed to the amount obligated
to those projects) was too low to have produced significant results.  Russia had also
eliminated many of its strategic offensive forces covered by the START I Treaty
before it received much assistance from CTR programs.  The General Accounting
Office highlighted this point in its 1995 report, stating that “to date, the material
impact (emphasis added) of the aid actually delivered by the CTR program’s
destruction and dismantlement projects has generally been limited.”45
The Clinton Administration contended that GAO’s measure of material impact
understates the effects of the CTR program because it does not measure the effect
that U.S. assistance had in demonstrating the high priority the U.S. places on the safe
and secure elimination of these weapons.  It also did not measure the effect that
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promises of U.S. assistance might have had on political decisions in recipient nations.
For example, the Administration noted that the promise of U.S. assistance under the
CTR program played a significant role in convincing leaders in Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their territories.  These three nations
had each agreed to return their nuclear weapons to Russia in the 1992 Lisbon
Protocol to the START I Treaty, but each began to question this commitment and all
voiced concerns about the costs of eliminating the delivery vehicles and basing
facilities for these weapons.46  After the Clinton Administration promised that the
United States would provide assistance with the costs of deactivating and dismantling
their weapons if the nations resumed their commitment to become nuclear-free,  each
of these nations approved the START Treaty, joined the NPT as non-nuclear
weapons states, and proceeded to return the warheads on their territories to Russia.
The Clinton Administration acknowledged, as GAO noted, that Russia began
eliminating its strategic offensive weapons under START I even before it began
receiving U.S. assistance.  And it did not dispute those who state that Russia probably
has the resources to comply with START I without U.S. assistance.  But Clinton
Administration officials noted that U.S. assistance can ensure that the reduction
process takes place in the “safest and most secure manner possible.”47  U.S. assistance
can also accelerate the reduction process and help Russia reach the treaty limits earlier
than it could by itself.
Scope of the CTR Programs
As was noted above, the Clinton Administration has divided the CTR program
into three distinct project areas: destruction and dismantlement; chain of custody; and
demilitarization.48  Early projects — such as the provision of storage containers,
bullet-proof blankets, and secure rail cars — were chain of custody efforts.  Many
projects that received significant funding in recent years focused on strategic offensive
arms elimination and other dismantlement and destruction activities.  To date, funding
for demilitarization efforts has been relatively low and Congress has refused to fund
some projects in this area.  This is discussed in more detail below.
Several factors have affected the balance of funding among CTR program areas.
For example, the focus of U.S. efforts has shifted as time has passed.  Early projects
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assisted the safe and secure transportation of warheads out of the non-Russian
republics, a process that is now complete.  In recent years, a significant portion of
U.S. funding has assisted with elimination of the missiles and launchers that once
carried these warheads.  This effort may also wind down in a few years, when all four
recipient nations complete their reductions under the START I Treaty, but it could
resume in the future if the Russian parliament approves the START II Treaty and the
United States provides funding to help Russia eliminate weapons covered by that
agreement.
Some analysts argue that these funding outcomes reflect political and
organizational, as much as policy priorities.49  For example, although CTR programs
are an interagency effort, some analysts believe the Department of Defense has more
influence than other agencies because its budget contains the funds for CTR
programs.  Because the Department of Defense has preferred to focus on
dismantlement and destruction activities, these efforts have received the most CTR
funding in recent years.50 
The preferences and priorities of officials in the recipient nations have also
affected the funding for CTR programs.  For example, officials in the non-Russian
republics indicated that they could not eliminate the nuclear weapons on their
territories unless they received financial assistance for this effort.  As a result, CTR
funding for strategic offensive arms and nuclear infrastructure elimination has grown
in recent years.  At the same time, although the United States would have liked to
allocate more funds for chain of custody efforts, officials in Russia did not share this
priority.  The United States experienced particular difficulties gaining cooperation
from the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), which is responsible for nuclear
materials and facilities in Russia.  Several analysts have noted that officials at
MINATOM have been unwilling to give the United States access to sensitive facilities
where most nuclear materials are stored.51 
Officials in Russia have also taken steps that slowed the implementation of some
projects.  For example, the United States is helping Russia design and construct a
facility at Mayak, near the Russian city of Chelyabinsk, to store materials and
components from nuclear weapons.  It has allocated $15 million to help design the
facility and $330 million for construction, but this project has been delayed several
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times.  Officials in Russia altered the design plans and the two sides were unable to
agree on the details of the final design or construction schedules for the facility.  In
early 1997, Clinton Administration officials noted that the two sides had resolved
many of these issues and construction was proceeding.  However, they noted that the
project could slow again because MINATOM had not been able to provide its full
financial contribution to the project and because the two nations had not reached an
agreement on transparency measures that would assure that materials stored in the
facility remained there.
The congressional debate over CTR funding in recent year has indicates that
some in Congress disagree with the Clinton Administration’s priorities for CTR
programs.  For example, concerns about DOD's priorities were part of the reason that
Congress expanded funding for DOE programs directly in the FY1997 Defense
Authorization Act.  The following discussion highlights some of the specific
differences in priorities.
Dismantlement and Destruction Activities.  Most Members of Congress
continue to support U.S. assistance with the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear
and other weapons in the former Soviet Union.  Some, however, have questioned
whether the United States needs to provide so much assistance on some projects that
may not have direct implications for U.S. national security. Specifically, some
Members have questioned whether the United States should help fund the elimination
of Russia’s chemical weapons.  In FY1998 and FY1999, the House cut out funding
for the chemical weapons destruction facility; the funds were restored by the
Conference Committee.  In its report on the FY1999 Defense Bill (H.Rept. 105-532),
the House  noted that it believed strategic offensive arms elimination should take
priority over chemical weapons destruction because Russia’s chemical weapons
stockpile does not pose a direct security threat to the United States.52  Members who
support U.S. assistance for chemical weapons destruction note that it does contribute
to U.S. security, both by reducing the threat from Russian weapons and by supporting
Russian compliance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention.
Nevertheless, in FY2000and FY2001, the Conference Committee adopted the House
position and eliminated funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility.
Congress did, however, approve the Bush Administration’s request of $50 million for
chemical weapons destruction activities, including $35 million for the construction of
the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia, in the FY2002 budget.  The
House Armed Services Committee continued to express concerns about this project,
but appeared willing to proceed as long as Russia maintained its financial commitment
to the effort and as long as the international community appeared willing to help with
funding.  The Bush Administration has indicated that it will request an increase in
funding for this effort in FY2003.
Chain of Custody Activities.  Most Members of Congress also believe that
chain of custody projects generally serve U.S. interests by reducing the risks of
proliferation.  Some have, however, questioned the U.S. approach to implementing
these projects, in part because large sums of money have been obligated with few
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apparent results.  In addition, some questioned the need for added funds in these areas
because the United States and Russia had not yet concluded agreements needed to
implement some of the projects.  Nevertheless, Congress approved the
Administration’s FY1998 request for $100.7 million for chain of custody activities.
These funds will be used to support the design and construction of the fissile materials
storage facility at Mayak, the provision of containers that will hold the stored fissile
materials, and  improvements in security at weapons storage areas.
Some in Congress believe that the Administration has devoted too few resources
to ensuring the safety and security of materials that could be used to produce nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons.  This concern, and questions about the U.S. ability
to deter or respond to terrorist attacks with these weapons, prompted Senators Nunn,
Lugar, and Domenici to sponsor the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 1996.  Although Administration officials testified that they did not need
additional funds for CTR programs, this legislation added $37 million to the CTR
budget.  The added funds supported materials protection, control, and accounting
projects and efforts to dismantle facilities that had produced chemical and biological
weapons.53  Congress approved an additional $20 million in DOD funds in FY1998
for the dismantlement of chemical and biological weapons facilities and $137 million
in DOE funds in FY1998 for materials protection, control, and accounting projects.
In FY1997, Congress also mandated that DOD use $10 million to support a DOE
project that will help Russia design a nuclear power reactor to replace a reactor that
had both generated power and produced plutonium for nuclear weapons.  Although
the House initially rejected added funding for this project, Congress eventually
approved the requested $41 million for this effort in FY1998.  The House also
approved the Administration's request for $29.8 million for this project in FY1999,
although it noted that management had moved back to DOD and that it believed
responsibility for the program should reside in DOE.
Demilitarization Programs.  Congress added demilitarization programs to
the CTR mandate in FY1993.  Most Members continue to support funding for the
International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev54.  But, many
have been critical of projects designed to convert plants in Russia’s defense industry
to peaceful endeavors.  Some believe that this funding will simply subsidize the
Russian defense industry and would rather use the funds for defense conversion or
other projects in the United States.  In addition, in its 1995 report, the General
Accounting Office found that most CTR defense conversion efforts were “converting
dormant facilities that once produced items related to weapons of mass destruction,”
rather than eliminating current production capacity.55  
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The Clinton Administration  responded to these criticisms by noting that defense
conversion projects at dormant facilities would reduce pressure on Russia to reopen
these plants and either rearm itself or sell high-tech weapons abroad.  In addition,
U.S. assistance was never designed to convert all of Russia’s defense industry to
civilian purposes, but, instead, to promote conversion by encouraging U.S. investment
in Russian enterprises.  Congress was not swayed by these arguments.  The FY1998
Defense Authorization Act contains an amendment that prohibits the use of funds in
the CTR budget for defense conversion in the former Soviet Union.  But ongoing
projects that use private corporate funds or are funded through the Defense Enterprise
Fund or DOE’s Industrial Partnering Program will continue.
Congress has also strongly opposed the use of CTR funds for housing
construction and environmental restoration projects.  In support of these projects,
Secretary Perry noted that several former Soviet republics have laws that prohibit the
demobilization of military units unless there is civilian housing for the officers retiring
from that unit.  But these new nations suffer from severe housing shortages.  So,
without assistance in the construction of housing, the recipient nations would not have
been able to complete the deactivation and elimination of nuclear weapons on their
territories.56  Secretary Perry noted similar reasons for U.S. assistance with
environmental restoration at former nuclear weapons facilities.  Both Ukraine and
Belarus claimed that the Soviet Union had seriously undermined the environment
when establishing nuclear missile bases in their nations.  As a result, these nations
sought U.S. assistance with both weapons deactivation and environmental restoration
as a part of the effort to eliminate those bases.
Many in Congress were not convinced by these arguments.  They have argued
that the funds could be better used for projects in the United States; some suggested
that the funds could provide housing for U.S. veterans who lack sufficient resources.
As a result, Congress banned the use of CTR funds for housing construction or
environmental restoration in the FY1996, FY1997, and FY1998 Defense
Authorization Acts.57
Russia's Financial Commitment to CTR Projects
Both supporters and critics of the CTR program have noted that final costs of
some projects could grow as the projects proceed.  In addition, they have noted that,
in many cases, Russia seems less willing, or able, to commit resources to these
projects than does the United States.  As a result, some have expressed concerns that
the United States could end up paying far more than it intended to complete projects
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facility until the United States and Russia conclude a transparency agreement that would
permit the United States to monitor the quantities and types or materials stored at the facility.
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that were initiated with the expectation that Russia would contribute a substantial
portion of the funding.  The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that Russia's
economic weakness may limit its contribution to some CTR projects, but it does not
agree that the United States will end up footing Russia's portion of the bill. 
Nevertheless, Congress included several provisions in the FY1998 Defense
Authorization Act that are designed to limit the size of the U.S. contribution to some
projects and to ensure that Russia contributes its own resources.  For example,
Section 1404 of the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act states that no FY1998 CTR
funds can be obligated or expended on strategic offensive arms elimination projects
in Russia that are related to the START II Treaty until the Secretary of Defense
certifies that Russia has agreed to share the costs for the projects.  This provision
responded not only to concerns about Russia's willingness to commit its own
resources to the arms elimination process, but also to lingering concerns about
Russia's strategic modernization programs.58  As was noted above, some Members of
Congress believe that U.S. dismantlement assistance is "subsidizing" Russia's
modernization programs because Russia can direct its resources towards
modernization while the United States pays to eliminate its older weapons systems.
Congress has also sought to limit the U.S. contribution to the construction of the
plutonium storage facility at Mayak.  The United States had stated that it planned to
limit its contribution to $275 million, but Russia has not agreed on that amount and
Russia has been unable to provide its portion of the funding thus far.59  As a result,
Section 1407 of the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act states that FY1998 CTR
funds cannot be obligated or expended on this project until the United States and
Russia reach an agreement that specifies the total cost to the United States for this
project.60
Linkage Between U.S. Assistance and Russian Policies
Virtually all supporters and critics of the CTR programs agree that U.S.
assistance should be linked, in some way, to policies in the recipient nations.  Many
disagree, however, on which activities should be linked to U.S. assistance and how
high the standards for behavior should be.
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Requirements in Current Legislation.  When Congress first passed the
Nunn-Lugar amendment in 1991, it mandated that the President certify annually that
each of the recipients is committed to:
! making a substantial investment of its own resources for dismantling or
destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons;
! forgoing any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements or is designed to replace destroyed weapons of mass destruction;
! forgoing the use of fissile materials and other components from destroyed
nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons;
! facilitating U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S. money;
! complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
! observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of
minorities.
Through FY1997, the Clinton Administration consistently certified that each of
the recipient nations — Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan — met these
conditions.  The Administration withdrew its certification for Belarus for FY1998
because that nation has demonstrated a pattern of human rights abuses.61  Some
observers have, nonetheless, questioned the Administration’s certifications.  The
debate results, in part, from the fact that the President must certify that each of the
recipient nations is committed to the actions specified in the conditions.  Some
observers argue that this formulation leaves too much room for interpretation because
the Clinton Administration can base its certification on statements by Russian leaders,
rather than actual events or activities.
For example, the Clinton Administration acknowledges that, at the present time,
some Russian activities raise questions about compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention and the bilateral Chemical Weapons Data Exchange and Destruction
Agreements.62  But the Administration certified that Russia had satisfied the condition
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and Russia make "substantial progress" in resolving compliance questions.
that it comply with all relevant arms control agreements by highlighting the extensive
steps Russia has taken to comply with START I and other treaties and by referring
to statements that President Yeltsin had made, both publicly and privately, about his
commitment to resolve outstanding questions on the other treaties.  In another
example, the Clinton Administration has pointed to the ongoing political reforms in
Russia as evidence that Russia is committed to observing internationally recognized
human rights, but many other observers have argued that Russia continues to oppress
its minorities, with the 1996 conflict in Chechnya as the primary example.
In some cases, critics argue that the United States does not have enough
information to draw the conclusions needed in the certifications.  For example, the
Clinton Administration certified that Russia was not using fissile materials from
dismantled weapons in new weapons because Russia has agreed to sell the United
States 500 metric tons of uranium from nuclear weapons.  But many observers have
noted that this represents a small proportion of the highly enriched uranium that the
Soviet Union produced over the years.  And the United States has no way of knowing
what Russia is doing with the rest of the uranium, regardless of any verbal assurances
received from the Yeltsin government.  Similarly, the Clinton Administration has
noted that Russia does not plan to reuse plutonium from eliminated weapons because
it has sought U.S. assistance with the construction of a long-term storage facility for
this material.  Russian officials have stated that they did not need such a facility when
they were reusing materials in new weapons.  But, many observers have noted that
the United States does not know how much plutonium the Soviet Union produced,
so it will never know whether the plutonium placed in the storage facility came from
old stockpiles or dismantled warheads.
In some cases, critics have questioned the conditions in the current legislation
because they allow the recipient nations to pursue activities that can threaten U.S.
national security.  For example, when certifying that recipient nations are using their
own resources to eliminate nuclear and other weapons, the Administration has pointed
to the progress that these nations have made in reducing their weapons under the
START I Treaty.  But some observers charge that Russia, in particular, must not be
committing enough of its own resources to weapons dismantlement because it has
continued to commit resources to weapons modernization programs.  They argue,
similarly, that these ongoing modernization programs indicate that Russia is not
satisfying the condition that it forgo any military modernization that exceeds
legitimate defense requirements.  Critics claim that two programs in particular — the
continuing production of the follow-on to the SS-25 ICBM (now designated the SS-
27 ICBM) and reports of continuing work on a huge underground military complex
at Yamanatau in the Urals Mountains — provide evidence of excessive military
modernization in Russia.
The Clinton Administration agreed that Russia was modernizing its ICBM force
with the new, single-warhead SS-27 missile, but it argues that this program is neither
prohibited by nor inconsistent with Russia’s obligations under arms control treaties.
To the contrary, the United States has tried to craft arms control agreements so that
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the Soviet Union (now Russia) would replace its large, multiple warhead missiles with
single-warhead systems.  This is because most analysts believe single-warhead missiles
do not pose the same destabilizing first strike threat as multiple warhead systems.
And, because Russia has to eliminate so many multiple warhead missiles under
START II, it can only keep its forces at the levels permitted by that treaty if it
produces new single-warhead systems.  With respect to the underground facility at
Yamanatau, the Clinton Administration has noted that this project seems misplaced
in light of Russia’s economic crisis, but it does not believe the complex is a threat to
the United States at this time.
Proposals for Changes in the Linkage between U.S. Assistance and
Russian Policies.  Several members of Congress and analysts outside government
have suggested changes in the certification process and new links between U.S.
assistance under the CTR program with Russian behavior in a number of areas.
Stricter Standards for Certification.  Some have proposed that Congress
alter the certification process by removing the “committed to” section of legislation.
This change could reduce the Administration’s flexibility when determining whether
recipients should continue to receive U.S. assistance because the certification might
have to reflect ongoing activities, without reference to stated intentions by officials
in the recipient nations.  For example, the United States would have to certify that the
recipient nations were actually complying with all arms control agreements, not just
committed to such compliance.  Although Congress has not adopted this change for
all arms control efforts, it did, in the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act, block
expenditures on chemical weapons and biological weapons projects until the
Administration provides such certifications with respect to chemical weapons and
biological weapons agreements, or until the Administration certifies that these projects
are in the U.S. national security interest.
Some have also proposed that Congress alter the legislation so that the United
States would have to certify that Russia had ceased all nuclear modernization
programs without reference to whether the U.S. deems the programs to be in excess
of legitimate defense requirements.  Those who favor this approach see it as a
response to concerns about whether U.S. assistance is subsidizing ongoing military
programs in Russia.63
Some supporters of CTR programs have objected to these proposed changes.
They note that strict compliance with arms control agreements is an elusive objective.
The United States and Russia often have questions about the other side’s compliance
records; most of the perceived problems are not central to the treaty’s objectives or
significant enough to justify a disruption in ongoing CTR projects.  And some have
noted that CTR projects, such as the construction of a chemical weapons destruction
facility, could actually help the recipient nations meet their arms control obligations.
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Cutting off assistance in response to question’s about Russia’s compliance to date
with chemical weapons agreements could actually prove counterproductive.  CTR
supporters have also noted the efforts to link CTR assistance to Russian nuclear
weapons modernization could produce unintended consequences.  They believe that,
if forced to choose, Russia would continue its modernization programs and leave
older weapons in place.  This would not serve the long-standing U.S. interest in
eliminating Russia’s large, multiple-warhead ICBMs.
Broader Linkage to Russian Defense and Foreign Policy.  During
debate over the FY1997 and FY1998 Defense Authorization Bills, many Members of
the House supported proposals to link U.S. assistance under CTR programs to a
number of Russian foreign and defense policies. These included not only Russia’s
compliance with arms control agreements and nuclear weapons modernization
programs but also Russia’s military operations in Chechnya, its relationship with other
former Soviet republics, its planned sale of short range missiles to China, and its
cooperation programs with other nations including Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and
Syria.64   Many who supported efforts to link CTR assistance to this broad range of
issue areas believed that the United States could discourage Russian activities that
were inconsistent with U.S. security interests.
Others have argued that such links would be ineffective.  They note that the
value of U.S. CTR assistance, at around $400 million per year, is too low to provide
the United States with much leverage over Russian actions.  And they argue that
Russia would probably forgo U.S. aid if it believed it needed to pursue other actions
to satisfy its national security needs.  Others have stated that the CTR program was
the wrong place to raise these issues because the United States would undermine its
own interests if it stopped the CTR programs to punish Russia for its behavior in
other areas.65  Representative Dellums summarized this perspective when he stated
“If we have foreign policy concerns ... there are other places where we can fight that
battle.  But to use the CTR program as the vehicle to challenge on all these other
bases I would suggest ... that it cuts off our nose to spite our face.”66 
Conclusion
When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in November 1991, it
sought to provide U.S. assistance quickly in response to the expected collapse of
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nuclear control and security in the Soviet Union.  Even though the original impetus
for U.S. assistance has passed, Congress continues to provide strong support for the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  Nevertheless, Congress has prohibited CTR
expenditures on some demilitarization programs and has questioned progress on
several other projects.  At the same time, Congress approved more money for CTR
programs to enhance the security of nuclear materials than the Administration
requested.
The issues raised in the past few years are likely to reappear in future debates
over CTR funding.  As long as Members remain concerned about security at nuclear
facilities and the potential for nuclear materials to leak to rogue nations or terrorist
groups, many are likely to continue to support active U.S. involvement in efforts to
secure these materials.  But as long as Russia continues to pursue programs and
policies that run counter to U.S. preferences and interests, many Members are likely
to continue to question the net value of U.S. assistance to Russia and the other former
Soviet republics.
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Appendix: Funding Status of CTR Programs
January 2001 (in current dollars)
Notified Obligated Disbursed
Destruction and Dismantlement $1,946,026,000 $1,582,042,880 $1,272,979,152
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
Russia $935,450,000 $684,337,208 $540,218,400
Ukraine $515,049,000 $453,259,301 $402,217,227
Belarus $3,343,000 $3,341,716 $3,341,210
Kazakhstan $59,917,000 $59,478,065 $57,523,934
WMD Infrastructure  Elimination
Ukraine $23,400,000 $16,633,033 $14,429,075
Kazakhstan $36,006,000 $29,354,603 $28,164,057
Environmental Restoration Belarus $24,914,000 $24,914,299 $24,363,912
Continuous Communications Links
Ukraine $2,222,000 $2,064,955 $1,947,192
Belarus $1,025,000 $1,001,777 $1,000,766
Kazakhstan $2,400,000 $2,361,131 $2,310,376
Chemical Weapons Destruction, Russia $295,800,000 $271,340,042 $176,621,786
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
Kazakhstan $5,000,000 $4,991,632 $793,413
Former Soviet Union $33,000,000 $20,562,958 $14,043,608
Nukus Chemical Resarch, Uzbekistan $8,500,000 $8,402,160 $6,004,196
Chain of Custody $1,079,813,291 $861,484,762 $649,274,183
Material Control and Accounting
Russia $44,789,000 $44,098,946 $43,707,686
Ukraine $22,215,000 $22,178,971 $21,745,995
Belarus $2,593,000 $2,598,683 $2,593,438
Kazakhstan $22,156,000 $22,156,763 $21,828,566
Emergency Response Training and Equipment
Russia $16,436,000 $14,945,376 $14,825,535
Ukraine $3,110,000 $2,946,727 $2,796,108
Belarus $5,000,000 $4,893,307 $4,822,180
Kazakhstan $4,672,000 $4,689,520 $3,987,859
Export Controls
Russia $2,260,000 $2,224,084 $2,224,084
Ukraine $13,949,000 $13,911,885 $13,845,736
Belarus $12,301,000 $12,122,795 $12,079,848
Kazakhstan $7,168,000 $7,168,275 $7,112,658
Georgia $1,170,000 $1,137,548 $1,112,726
Nuclear Reactor Safety Initiative, Ukraine $11,000,000 $11,000,000 $10,992,768
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Russia Only:
Armored Blankets $3,322,000 $2,991,247 $2,991,247
Fissile Material Containers $73,507,291 $73,399,559 $69,110,813
Fis. material storage facility $387,125,000 $322,251,506 $187,677,133
Storage facility design  $15,000,000 $14,998,584 $14,955,828
Fissile material processing and packaging $0 $0 $0
Weapons transportation  security $73,500,000 $58,710,397 $42,708,575
Weapons storage security $306,900,000 $171,576,163 $117,973,956
Rail Car Security Enhancements $21,500,000 $21,379,883 $21,338,514
Reactor Core Conversion $26,050,000 $25,971,293 $24,709,681
Auburn Endeavor, Georgia $4,090,000 $4,133,250 $4,133,249
Demilitarization $389,488,000 $359,605,275 $345,204,565
Science and Technology Centers
Russia $35,000,000 $34,892,568 $34,892,567
Ukraine $15,000,000 $15,000,000 $14,690,031
Belarus $1,034,460 $1,034,460 $1,034,460
Kazakhstan $9,000,000 $9,000,000 $9,000,000
Other $3,965,540 $3,965,540 $3,965,540
Defense Enterprise Fund
Russia $10,000,000 $10,000,000 $10,000,000
Belarus $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $5,000,000
Kazakhstan $7,000,000 $7,000,000 $7,000,000
Other $44,670,000 $44,670,000 $44,670,000
Defense Conversion
Russia $43,661,000 $34,859,818 $34,364,188
Ukraine $55,730,000 $55,067,264 $54,640,907
Belarus $19,253,000 $19,252,551 $19,243,156
Kazakhstan $17,200,000 $17,041,468 $16,934,049
Industrial Partnering Program (all) $10,000,000 $10,000,000 $9,175,229
Research & Development  Foundation, Russia $10,000,000 $10,000,000 $10,000,000
Defense and Military Contacts
Russia $14,664,333 $11,906,805 $10,036,598
Ukraine $7,500,000 $5,091,703 $3,653,939
Belarus $472,000 $472,075 $419,911
Kazakhstan $2,300,000 $1,551,911 $1,216,855
Other $33,752,667 $19,840,906 $14,017,370
CP $4,285,000 $3,958,206 $1,249,765
Special Project $40,000,000 $40,000,000 $40,000,000
Arctic nuclear waste study - Russia $30,000,000 $29,988,749 $28,695,959
Administrative Costs $103,239,709 $93,547,739 $84,675,684
Grand Total  $3,548,567,000 $2,926,669,405 $2,380,829,543
Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defens
